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I
nvestors and policymakers have long hoped that Treasury Inflation
Protected Securities (TIPS) would provide an accurate measure of
long-term market inflation expectations. To make informed deci-
sions and to ensure that inflation does not erode the purchasing power of
their assets, investors need to assess the rate of inflation expected by
other market participants. Having an accurate measure of market infla-
tion expectations can also help policymakers assess their effectiveness in
controlling long-term inflation, as well as their credibility among mar-
ket participants. Until recently, however, the only sources of information
about long-term inflation expectations were surveys and the term struc-
ture of interest rates, neither of which were considered highly reliable.
With the introduction of TIPS in 1997, it was hoped that a new meas-
ure of market inflation expectations—the difference in yields between
conventional Treasuries and TIPS—would become available.
The yield difference between conventional Treasuries and TIPS may
provide an accurate measure of market inflation expectations because
inflation has very different effects on the returns to the two kinds of secu-
rities. The yield on a conventional Treasury must compensate the buyer for
any expected erosion in purchasing power due to future inflation. In con-
trast, the buyer of an inflation protected Treasury need not worry about
future inflation because the principal and interest payments are both
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indexed to inflation. As a result, the yield difference between conventional
and inflation protected Treasuries of given maturity should reveal the rate
of future inflation expected by market participants. 
Not everyone agrees, however, that the yield difference provides an
accurate measure of expected inflation. Skeptics point out that the yield
difference may depend on other factors, such as the liquidity difference
between the two kinds of Treasuries, making it difficult to extract infor-
mation about market inflation expectations. 
This article examines the empirical evidence on the behavior of the
yield difference and the liquidity of the TIPS market. The article finds
that the yield difference has not provided a good measure of market
inflation expectations because of the large and variable liquidity pre-
mium on TIPS. Still, the yield difference may become a better measure
of market inflation expectations as liquidity conditions in the two kinds
of Treasury markets move closer in the future.
The first section of the article explains why the yield difference
between conventional Treasuries and TIPS might provide a good meas-
ure of market inflation expectations. The second section examines the
actual behavior of the yield difference since TIPS were introduced and
points out that the yield difference appears to be influenced by factors
other than market inflation expectations. The third section investigates
the role of market liquidity and concludes that the difference in liquid-
ity between the two types of Treasuries has kept the yield difference
from becoming a good measure of expected inflation. The fourth section
suggests that the yield difference between conventional and inflation
protected Treasuries may approximate market inflation expectations
better in the future.
I. WHAT ARE YIELD SPREADS AND MIGHT THEY
TRACK MARKET INFLATION EXPECTATIONS?
As TIPS are relatively new to many investors, this section briefly
describes their main features. The section then examines the different
components of the yield difference, or spread, between conventional and
inflation protected Treasuries. The section shows that the expected rate
of future inflation is the main component of the yield spread. The sec-
tion also shows, however, that other components, such as the inflation
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risk premium and the liquidity premium may also be important, com-
plicating the task of extracting information about market inflation
expectations.
What are TIPS?
Since 1997, the U.S. Treasury has been issuing debt instruments,
the payoffs of which are tied to the inflation rates during the lives of the
instruments. They are called Treasury Inflation Protected Securities, as
they protect investors from the risk of unexpected inflation.1
The first indexed Treasury was issued in January 1997, with a
maturity of ten years. Since then, the U.S. Treasury has regularly issued
10-year TIPS every January and sold additional quantities of the Janu-
ary issue later in the year.2 The Treasury has also issued TIPS with 5-
year and 30-year maturities, but with less regularity.3 Currently, there
are about $135 billion worth of TIPS outstanding, compared with more
than $2.8 trillion worth of conventional Treasuries. Thus, TIPS consti-
tute less than 5 percent of the total outstanding value of Treasuries.4
Within the universe of indexed Treasuries, 10-year TIPS make up more
than half of the outstanding total.
The most important feature of TIPS is that investors in these Trea-
suries are protected from the risk of unexpected inflation. To understand
this, first it is helpful to appreciate the inflation risk embedded in con-
ventional Treasuries. In a conventional Treasury security, the coupon
rate is fixed at a nominal rate at the auction. Consequently, the nominal
return to holding such a Treasury to maturity is fixed at the time of pur-
chase.5 As what matters to investors is the purchasing power of their
investment, investors focus on the real return, which is the difference
between the nominal return and the inflation rate during the life of the
investment. For example, if an investor buys a 10-year conventional
Treasury at its par value with a coupon rate of 6 percent, and inflation
turns out to average 2 percent for the next ten years, then the real
return on this investment is 4 percent. On the other hand, if inflation
turns out to be 4 percent, then the real return is only 2 percent.6 In
other words, an investor in conventional Treasuries is exposed to infla-
tion risk in the sense that the real return is inversely related to the
actual rate of inflation during the life of the security.
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In contrast to conventional Treasuries, the real return to investors
on a TIPS is fixed at auction time and is unaffected by the actual rate of
inflation during the life of the security. This happens because the
coupon rate on an indexed Treasury is fixed in real terms, and the dollar
value of the principal grows with inflation over the life of the TIPS. For
example, in January 2001, the U.S. Treasury issued a 10-year indexed
security with a coupon rate of 3.5 percent. If an investor buys this secu-
rity at par in January and holds it to maturity, and if actual Consumer
Price Index (CPI) inflation turns out to average 2.5 percent in the next
ten years, the real return to the investor is 3.5 percent even though the
average nominal yield is 6 percent.7 If instead, inflation turns out to
average 5 percent, the investor’s real return is still 3.5 percent, although
the nominal yield is 8.5 percent. In both scenarios the real yield, or the
rate of return to the investor in terms of purchasing power, is identical
and unaffected by inflation.8
Why is expected inflation a component of the yield spread?
The difference between the quoted yields on a conventional and an
indexed Treasury security with similar maturity is usually referred to as
the yield spread between the two securities. In the bond market, the
commonly quoted yield on a conventional Treasury is the nominal yield,
while the most commonly quoted yield on an indexed Treasury is the
real yield.9 Therefore, yield spreads are differences between nominal
yields and real yields.
In a world where investors are indifferent to risks, only expected real
yields matter. In such a world, yield spreads mainly reflect the average
rate of future inflation expected by bond market participants, that is, the
market inflation expectation, which is sometimes called expected infla-
tion. Investors will always purchase the Treasury with a higher real yield,
causing prices to adjust, which results in both nominal and indexed Trea-
suries ending up with the same expected real yield. In this world, the
yield spread is an accurate measure of expected inflation. That is, 
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where yn is the nominal yield on a 10-year conventional Treasury, yr is the
real yield on a 10-year indexed Treasury, and peis the average of market
participants’ expected rates of future inflation for the next ten years.
In this world, the yield spread provides a quick, reliable, and timely
measure of expected inflation, which is highly valuable to consumers,
investors, as well as policymakers. Accurate measures of market infla-
tion expectation are difficult to come by. Before the existence of the
inflation protected Treasuries, the most commonly used measures of
expected inflation were forecasts based on survey responses. But survey
measures of expected inflation only cover a very small portion of the
population and are updated infrequently. Further, such measures may
not be completely reliable if survey respondents answer questions casu-
ally. In contrast, the yield spread is based on investment decisions of
large numbers of investors who risk their own money for such decisions.
Further, this information is updated every day when financial markets
are open and trading occurs freely. Thus, in a world in which investors
care only about expected real yields, yield spreads should be a better
measure of market inflation expectations than survey forecasts.10
Why the yield spread may have other components
In the real world, other factors may affect yield spreads because
investors may care about more than just the expected real yields. In par-
ticular, one thing investors may care about besides the expected real yield
is inflation risk. This is the risk that the real return on a security turns out
to be different from what investors expected because inflation turns out
to be higher or lower than expected. As noted earlier, TIPS have no infla-
tion risk. In contrast, a conventional Treasury can have considerable
inflation risk because the real return on such a security moves inversely
with the actual rate of inflation during the life of the security. As a result,
a conventional security will generally have to carry a higher expected real
yield than an indexed Treasury just to be equally attractive to investors.
This additional yield is usually called the inflation risk premium, as it is a
premium to compensate investors for taking on the risk.
Another thing investors may care about besides the expected real
yield is liquidity risk. The liquidity risk of an asset is the risk that
investors may incur large costs buying or selling the asset in a secondary
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market. The need to raise cash or make other portfolio adjustments may
force an investor to buy or sell a security in the secondary market. As a
result, investors need to consider the likely costs associated with such
trading. Some of the costs are known, such as brokerage fees and com-
missions. These kinds of costs are ignored in the discussion, as investors
tend to face similar brokerage fees and commissions for trading conven-
tional and indexed Treasuries.11 Other costs are related to the ease and
convenience of trading, which are more uncertain in nature. For exam-
ple, for less liquid assets, a seller of a large-dollar value of securities may
have to accept a lower price to complete the sale in a timely fashion.
Since the probability of incurring such costs is inversely related to the
liquidity of the asset, the less liquid asset carries higher liquidity risk.
Consequently, the less liquid asset needs to carry a higher compensating
yield in order to attract investors. This additional yield is commonly
referred to as a liquidity premium.12
Liquidity risk is more relevant to investors in TIPS than to investors
in conventional Treasuries. As the market for conventional Treasury secu-
rities is the most liquid asset market in the United States, the liquidity
risk for conventional Treasuries can be considered to be zero.13 The mar-
ket for TIPS, on the other hand, is less liquid. As a result, it is likely that
part of the yield on an indexed Treasury is a liquidity premium. 
In this more realistic world where investors are concerned about risk,
the yield spread between a conventional and an indexed Treasury is no
longer an accurate measure of market inflation expectation. The yield
spread now equals: (1) the expected inflation rate over the life of the
security, plus (2) the inflation risk premium on the conventional Treasury,
minus (3) the liquidity premium on the TIPS. More formally, the yield
spread is
,
where p(p) is the inflation risk premium on the conventional Treasury,
and p(l) is the liquidity premium on the indexed Treasury.14
In this world, the yield spread can be higher or lower than expected
inflation. If the inflation risk premium exceeds the liquidity premium,
the yield spread will be higher than expected inflation. If, on the other
hand, the inflation risk premium is smaller than the liquidity premium,
the yield spread will be lower than expected inflation. Only when the
yy p p l
nr e -=+ () - () pp
Shen.qxd  1/28/02  11:17 AM  Page 66ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2001 67
inflation risk premium is the same size as the liquidity premium will the
yield spread equal the expected rate of inflation. Note, however, that if
both premia are small relative to expected inflation, their difference will
be even smaller, and the yield spread will be a close approximation of
expected inflation. Furthermore, even if the yield spread is an inaccurate
measure of expected inflation, the change in the spread may still be a
good measure of the change in market inflation expectations. This will
be the case if both the inflation risk premium and the liquidity premium
are roughly constant over time.
II. HOW CLOSELY DO YIELD SPREADS TRACK
MARKET INFLATION EXPECTATIONS?
This section examines actual data to show how well the yield spread
and the change in the yield spread perform as measures of market infla-
tion expectations. First, examination of the level of yield spread since
the inception of TIPS reveals that the level is generally lower than the
plausible level of expected inflation. Next, examination of the changes
in the yield spread shows that the changes appear to be too volatile to
reflect only changes in expected inflation.
Is the level of the yield spread a good proxy for expected inflation?
To evaluate the yield spread as a measure of inflation expectations,
we focus on the yield spread between the most active 10-year conven-
tional and inflation-indexed Treasuries.15 Ten-year conventional Trea-
sury notes are auctioned regularly by the U.S. Treasury, and the
secondary market for those securities is well developed and very liquid.
Ten-year indexed Treasury notes are also the most liquid within the uni-
verse of TIPS. Chart 1 shows the nominal yield on the 10-year conven-
tional Treasury note, the real yield on the 10-year TIPS, and the yield
spread, from July 1997 to November 2001.16
Comparison of yield spread with actual inflation. In principle, one way
to evaluate how well yield spreads approximate market inflation expec-
tations would be to see how well the spreads forecast actual inflation.
The idea is that expected inflation should be a good forecast of actual
future inflation. Thus, any proxy for market inflation expectations
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should also be a good forecast of actual future inflation. Market infla-
tion expectations should be a good forecast of inflation because they are
an average of market participants’ forecasts. Since investors suffer finan-
cial losses when their forecasts err, it seems reasonable to assume that
market participants will try to forecast future inflation as accurately as
possible. Further, while an individual investor’s forecast may deviate
widely from the actual outcome, the market average of all individuals’
best efforts should produce a reasonably good forecast.17
Unfortunately, the short history of TIPS makes it difficult to assess
the performance of the spread as a forecast for inflation. If several
decades of data were available, it would be a simple matter to look back
over the period and statistically compare the ten-year forecast with real-
ized ten-year average inflation. However, with less than a five-year his-
tory, we are still more than five years away from knowing the actual
average of inflation over the ten-year period starting in 1997. As it
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There are, however, some alternatives to comparing the yield spread
to realized inflation that might be useful in judging the predictive abil-
ity of the yield spread. The most obvious approach is to use past infla-
tion rates to get a sense of some realistic ranges for future inflation.
What have the historical averages of CPI inflation been over ten-year
periods since 1950?18 These decade averages are computed monthly
and plotted in Chart 2. Each data point in the chart represents the
actual average inflation rate for the past ten years ending at that month.
For example, the data point for September 1998 is 3.18 percent, which
means that the ten-year average CPI inflation rate from October 1988
through September 1998 was 3.18 percent. Over the period of more
than 50 years, we can calculate about 500 overlapping monthly aver-
ages of actual ten-year inflation rates, with the first average starting at
January 1960.
Compared with the experience of the past 50 years, it appears that
yield spreads have been predicting exceptionally low inflation for the
ten-year period ahead. As shown in Chart 2, the actual ten-year average
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never fallen below 1.0 percent. In stark contrast, the yield spread has
been well below 2.5 percent during most of the short history of TIPS.
As Chart 1 shows, the yield spread started out quite wide, at slightly
lower than 3 percent, but then narrowed rapidly to a low of 0.84 per-
cent at the end of 1998. From there the spread increased but never
came close to crossing the 2.5 percent level. In fact, the gap narrowed
again to a local low of 1.5 percent in December 2000. Clearly the
spread has been predicting much lower rates of inflation than have been
experienced over most of the last 50 years.19
While the forecast of future inflation based on yield spreads appears
to be unrealistically low compared with historical experience, the possi-
bility cannot be ruled out that the future inflation outlook may be differ-
ent from historical averages. For example, market participants may
believe that the Federal Reserve has learned from experience, so that
inflationary episodes of the past will not recur. An example of such an
episode is the late 1970s and early 1980s, when double-digit annual
inflation pushed the ten-year averages above 5 percent. Such inflationary
episodes have not been repeated, suggesting that they should perhaps be
excluded in estimating the most likely range of future inflation.20
Comparison of yield spreads with survey forecasts. How does the yield
spread as a measure of expected inflation compare with other forward-
looking forecasts, such as survey based forecasts? As noted earlier, survey
based forecasts are subject to the criticisms that the survey respondents
may represent only a small portion of the population, may be surveyed
infrequently, and may answer questions casually instead of giving their
best efforts. Nevertheless, comparing the yield spread to survey forecasts
may provide additional evidence on how reasonable the spread is as a
measure of expected inflation.
One widely followed inflation forecast is based on the Livingston
Survey of economists in industry, government, banking, and academia,
which is maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Twice
a year, the participants forecast the ten-year-ahead level of the CPI as
well as many other economic variables. The consensus of the Survey fore-
cast for CPI inflation is plotted in Chart 3, as is the level of the yield
spread. It is immediately clear that the yield spread bears little relation to
the future average inflation rate projected by the consensus of the survey.
Throughout the period, the yield spread was consistently lower than the
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rate of inflation predicted by the consensus of the Livingston Survey. The
difference ranges from a high of 1.61 percentage points in December
1998 to a low of 0.5 percentage point one year later. For the period as a
whole, the survey participants’ forecast of ten-year inflation averaged
2.61 percent, while the yield spread averaged only 1.74 percent.
Have changes in the yield spread been good proxies for changes
in expected inflation? 
As noted at the end of the first section, even if the liquidity pre-
mium is much bigger than the inflation risk premium, changes in the
yield spread may still approximate changes in market inflation expecta-
tions if both premia are stable over time. In principle, one way to deter-
mine if changes in the yield spread reflect changes in expected inflation
would be to see if they do a good job of forecasting changes in actual
inflation. As was true for the level of the spread, however, TIPS have
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can be done is to look at changes in the yield spread to see if they have
been about the right magnitude—that is, neither too small nor too big
to plausibly reflect changes in inflation expectations.
One way to determine if changes in the yield spread are about right
is to see whether changes in the yield spread are similar in size to changes
in survey forecasts. For the Livingston Survey, the average absolute
annual change in the ten-year consensus inflation forecast has been only
0.17 percentage points throughout the past decade. In contrast, the
average annual change in the TIPS yield spread from July 1997 to July
2001 has been 0.66 percentage point. For example, the Livingston fore-
cast edged down from 2.76 percent at the end of 1997 to 2.45 percent a
year later and then crept back up to 2.53 percent by the end of 1999.
Over the same period, the yield spread changed much more dramatically,
from 2.46 percent in late 1997 to an astonishing low of 0.89 percent a
year later, only to climb back to 2.00 percent at the end of 1999. Com-
pared with changes in the survey forecast, the yield spread appears to be
too volatile to be a reliable proxy of changes in expected inflation.
Another reason for doubting that changes in the yield spread are a
good proxy for changes in expected inflation is that the fundamental
factors affecting the long-term inflation outlook are unlikely to fluctu-
ate back and forth to the same degree the yield spread has. Federal
Reserve monetary policy determines the rate of inflation in the long run.
Therefore, a perceived increase in the Federal Reserve’s commitment to
price stability would likely lead to a decline in long-term market infla-
tion expectations. In contrast, a reduction in the Federal Reserve’s infla-
tion fighting credibility would likely be associated with an increase in
long-term inflation expectations. It is difficult to argue, however, that
there were fundamental changes from late 1997 to 1998 that vastly
improved the credibility of the Federal Reserve. It is even more difficult
to argue that other fundamental changes led to a comparable deteriora-
tion in the Federal Reserve’s credibility in the following year. 
To summarize, it appears that the level of the yield spread does not
approximate expected inflation, nor do changes in the yield spread
approximate changes in expected inflation. The level of the yield spread
has been lower than both the historical average of inflation and survey
forecasts of future inflation, suggesting that the liquidity premium on
TIPS is larger than the inflation risk premium on conventional Trea-
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suries. Further, changes in the yield spread appear too big to be due
solely to changes in expected inflation, suggesting that either the liquid-
ity premium or the inflation risk premium varies considerably over time.
III. CAN THE LIQUIDITY PREMIUM EXPLAIN
THE POOR PERFORMANCE OF YIELD SPREADS
AS A MEASURE OF EXPECTED INFLATION?
This section examines liquidity in more detail. First, it focuses on
the liquidity difference between conventional Treasuries and TIPS. Then
it examines the yield difference between the most liquid and some less
liquid conventional Treasuries. The liquidity premium on TIPS is likely
both sizable and highly volatile, suggesting that it is largely responsible
for the poor performance of the yield spread in approximating either the
level of expected inflation or the change in expected inflation. 
What do differences in trading volumes between conventional Treasuries
and TIPS reveal?
Trading volume is much lower for TIPS than conventional Trea-
suries, suggesting that the TIPS market is considerably less liquid. The
secondary market for conventional U.S. Treasuries is one of the most
active financial markets in the world. Billions of dollars of conventional
Treasuries are traded every day.21 In contrast, the trading volume for
TIPS is small due to their limited availability and their unfamiliarity to
investors, who have been able to purchase and trade them only since
1997. As shown in Chart 4, in 1998 the monthly trading volume of
TIPS was usually only about 1.3 percent of the trading volume of con-
ventional Treasuries.22 The ratio has since increased but is still very
small, at around 2 percent. 
The big difference in trading volumes between conventional and
indexed Treasuries may be a good indicator of their relative market liq-
uidity for two reasons. First, it is generally easier for investors to adjust
their individual positions in a security with higher trading volume,
because their trading actions are less likely to have an adverse impact on
the price of the security. Second, high trading volume may itself be a
result of higher liquidity in the underlying market. This is due to the fact
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that, everything else equal, investors are more likely to trade in an asset
that they perceive to have a more liquid market in order to save on liq-
uidity costs. Thus, the enormous disparity in trading volumes between
conventional Treasuries and TIPS suggests that investors perceive TIPS
to be considerably less liquid than conventional Treasuries, and may thus
require a sizable compensating liquidity premium to hold TIPS. 
The disparity in trading volume between TIPS and conventional
Treasuries also varies considerably over time, suggesting that the liquid-
ity premium on TIPS may also be highly variable. As shown in Chart 4,
the ratio of trading volumes can fluctuate by as much as 25 percent
within a few months. For example, during the height of the financial
market crisis in the fall of 1998, the ratio of trading volume plummeted
from around 1.3 percent to about 1 percent, due to both increased trad-
ing in conventional Treasuries and reduced trading in TIPS. This drop
suggests that investors’ appreciation of liquidity risk may have changed
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tional and indexed Treasuries reached its lowest point in the fall of
1998, which was consistent with a sharp increase in the liquidity pre-
mium on TIPS.
What does the liquidity premium on less liquid
conventional Treasuries reveal?
It is difficult to directly quantify the liquidity premium in the yield
spread between conventional Treasuries and TIPS because the spread
also depends on market expected inflation and inflation risk. A lower
bound for the liquidity premium on TIPS can be determined by exam-
ining the liquidity premium on less liquid conventional Treasury securi-
ties. As it turns out, sizable differences in yields exist among
conventional Treasury securities with a similar time to maturity and
newly issued securities that are highly liquid bearing lower yields than
less liquid, “aged” securities.
In the previous discussion, yield spreads were calculated using the
yields of “benchmark” conventional and indexed 10-year Treasuries. A
benchmark 10-year Treasury is the most recently auctioned 10-year
Treasury, which is also called an “on-the-run” issue. A previously auc-
tioned Treasury is called an “off-the-run” Treasury. Considerable differ-
ences exist between the market liquidity of on-the-run and off-the-run
Treasuries. Typically, on-the-run Treasuries are traded the most and
enjoy the most liquid market. An off-the-run Treasury, even though it
may be identical in terms of maturity and cash flow to an on-the-run
Treasury, is traded less frequently and therefore has lower market liquid-
ity. For example, an off-the-run 30-year Treasury auctioned 20 years ago
will be less liquid than a recently issued on-the-run 10-year Treasury.
Because on-the-run and off-the-run conventional Treasuries with
similar time to maturity are almost identical except for their liquidity,
the yield difference between the two types of Treasuries provides a clean
measure of the liquidity premium built into off-the-run conventional
Treasuries. The top of Chart 5 shows the average yields of 10-year off-
the-run Treasuries and of 10-year on-the-run Treasuries. The bottom of
the chart shows the yield difference, which is basically the liquidity pre-
mium on off-the-run Treasuries.23
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The liquidity premium on off-the-run conventional Treasuries has
ranged between 0.1 and 0.4 percentage point since mid-1997. Before
1998, the liquidity premium was a little above 0.10 percentage point.
During the height of the financial crisis in the fall of 1998, the liquidity
premium increased to twice its pre-crisis average.24 The premium
remained large over the next year, but fell somewhat in 2000.25 The
average liquidity premium before the fall of 1998 was 0.14 percentage
point, while the average since then has been about 0.23 percentage
point, more than 50 percent higher. Many analysts believe that market
participants have a new appreciation of liquidity risk after observing the
events in the fall of 1998, and that consequently the liquidity premium
on many financial assets has increased. The evidence in Chart 5 is con-
sistent with this view. 
The liquidity premium for off-the-run conventional Treasuries pro-
vides a lower bound for the liquidity premium in TIPS, since TIPS are
even less liquid than off-the-run conventional Treasuries. Specifically,
Chart 5 suggests that the average liquidity premium on TIPS has been
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accurate data are unavailable on the relative trading volumes of TIPS
and off-the-run Treasuries. However, there are good reasons for believ-
ing that TIPS are considerably less liquid than off-the-run Treasuries, so
that the liquidity premium on TIPS exceeds the lower bound of 0.23
percentage point by a substantial margin. First, TIPS are relatively new,
which means they are less familiar to investors than off-the-run Trea-
suries and less likely to be traded frequently. Second, TIPS are the only
security free from inflation risk, which means no other security is
directly comparable to them. This uniqueness makes TIPS more diffi-
cult to use in hedge transactions than off-the-run Treasuries, reducing
their trading volume still further.26
The fact that the liquidity premium on off-the-run Treasuries varies
considerably over time suggests that the liquidity premium on TIPS is
also highly variable. Liquidity conditions in individual asset markets
tend to evolve independently in the long run. In the short run, however,
a common factor can cause large, simultaneous changes in liquidity in
many separate asset markets. To the extent such broad disturbances
account for the high volatility in the off-the-run liquidity premium, the
TIPS liquidity premium should be highly volatile as well. Additional
support for this view comes from the fact that monthly changes in the
yield spread between conventional Treasuries and TIPS have been
highly correlated with monthly changes in the off-the-run liquidity pre-
mium. Over the period shown in Chart 5, for example, the correlation
coefficient between the two variables was slightly more than 0.5, which
is a relatively high number.
Changes in the liquidity premium on off-the-run Treasuries can also
provide valuable insight into specific changes in the TIPS yield spreads.
As noted earlier, the spread between conventional Treasuries and TIPS
plunged during the financial market crisis in the fall of 1998. As shown
in Chart 5, the liquidity premium on off-the-run Treasuries more than
trebled at the same time, as investors flew to safety and market liquid-
ity deteriorated for almost all assets except on-the-run Treasuries. The
fact that the yield spread decreased and the off-the-run liquidity pre-
mium increased at the same time reinforces the evidence from trading
volumes that the drop in the yield spread during this episode was
mainly due to an increase in the TIPS liquidity premium.27
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To  summarize, the evidence on relative trading volumes and the
evidence on the yield difference between on-the-run and off-the-run
conventional Treasuries both suggest there is a large and volatile liquid-
ity premium on TIPS. It seems likely that this liquidity premium has
been largely responsible for the yield spread being a poor measure of
market expected inflation.
IV. CAN YIELD SPREADS STILL BE USEFUL FOR
ASSESSING INFLATION EXPECTATIONS?
The large and variable liquidity premium in indexed Treasury secu-
rities appears to have diminished the reliability of the yield spread as an
indicator of market inflation expectations. This does not mean, how-
ever, that the yield spread will never provide useful information about
inflation expectations. Even now, the yield spread may still provide
insight into market inflation expectations when complemented by other
independent information. Further, as time goes on, the liquidity differ-
ence between conventional and indexed Treasuries is likely to become
smaller, reducing the liquidity premium on TIPS and improving the
accuracy of the yield spread as a measure of expected inflation.
As suggested in the previous section, one important case in which
independent information can be used to improve inferences from the
yield spreads about expected inflation is when liquidity premia are
observed to increase on a broad range of assets. In the fall of 1998, for
example, the liquidity premia on financial assets other than on-the-run
Treasuries were increasing. In such circumstances, it would have clearly
been unwise to interpret the decline in the yield spread between the
conventional and indexed Treasuries as evidence that expected inflation
had fallen. In other times, however, we may observe declines in the yield
spread without any noticeable changes in the liquidity premia on other
assets. In these instances, the decline in the yield spread is likely to be
an indication that expected inflation has decreased.
In the future, the continuing reduction in liquidity differences
between conventional and indexed Treasuries should also improve the
usefulness of the yield spreads. The ratio of trading volumes of TIPS to
conventional Treasuries has been trending upward (Chart 4). Several
factors have contributed to this trend and should continue to reduce the
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liquidity differences between the two types of Treasuries over time.
First, as investors become more familiar with inflation indexed Trea-
suries, their confidence and understanding will grow, leading to greater
demand for and trading in TIPS. Second, because only conventional
Treasuries are presently maturing, the total volume of outstanding TIPS
relative to the total volume of outstanding conventional Treasuries con-
tinues to increase.28 Such an increase in outstanding volume leads to a
deeper and more liquid market, reducing the liquidity disparity
between the two kinds of Treasuries. Finally, the simple mechanics of
indexing causes the principal of TIPS to grow at the rate of inflation
while the principal of conventional Treasuries remains fixed. This causes
the total dollar volume of TIPS outstanding to grow relative to the total
dollar volume of conventional Treasuries, which again deepens the TIPS
market and reduces the liquidity premium on TIPS.
The experience of the UK (see appendix for more details) supports
the view that the gradual increase in the liquidity of indexed bonds will
reduce the liquidity premium in the yield spread between conventional
and indexed securities. The indexed government debt market in the UK
is still somewhat less liquid than the conventional government debt
market. However, the trading volume for indexed government debt is
usually more than one-tenth the trading volume for conventional gov-
ernment debt, suggesting that the liquidity difference there is much
smaller than in the U.S. Furthermore, the yield spread is typically
higher than survey forecasts of inflation, implying that in contrast to
the U.S., the liquidity premium on indexed debt is smaller than the
inflation risk premium on conventional debt. Such evidence offers hope
that the liquidity of TIPS will improve and that the liquidity premium
may eventually become small enough for the yield spread to provide
valuable information about inflation expectations.
V. CONCLUSION 
The yield spread between conventional and inflation indexed Trea-
suries contains useful information about market expectations of future
inflation. The task of disentangling this information has been compli-
cated, however, by other components in the yield spreads—in particu-
lar, the inflation risk premium on conventional Treasuries and the
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liquidity premium on indexed Treasuries. The liquidity premium has
been especially important, causing the yield spread to understate mar-
ket inflation expectations. The liquidity premium has also been highly
volatile, causing the yield spread to vary too widely to reflect only
changes in inflation expectations. Nevertheless, if current trends con-
tinue, indexed Treasuries should become more liquid and the liquidity
premium should gradually decline, allowing the yield spread to more
closely approximate market inflation expectations. Even if this happens,
though, the yield spread may never be a perfect measure of expected
inflation because both the inflation risk premium and the liquidity pre-
mium may still vary over time. As a result, it will always be advisable to
combine yield spreads with other information to best estimate market
expectations of future inflation.
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APPENDIX
What Can We Learn from the UK Experience? 
In 1981 the Bank of England began issuing government debt
instruments that protect investors from the adverse effects of inflation
by indexing both the principal and coupon payments to inflation.
Called index-linked Gilts, these bonds pay a prespecified real coupon
rate and adjust the cash flow for changes in the General Index of Retail
Prices (RPI). By comparing the RPI at the time of the payment with the
RPI when the bond was issued, the return to investors is adjusted for
changes in the general price level.29
Because index-linked Gilts have been in existence far longer than
TIPS, they provide a useful reference against which to compare the per-
formance of the TIPS spread as a measure of expected inflation. Until
1991, for example, it was possible to directly compare the 10-year Gilt
yield spread to realized average inflation for the following ten years. In
contrast, the short history of TIPS makes it impossible to compare the
TIPS spread with realized ten-year inflation. 
The appendix chart shows the Gilt yield spread, realized ten-year
average inflation, and the survey-based forecast of inflation compiled by
Consensus Economics Inc. In sharp contrast with the U.S. experience,
the UK yield spread has been consistently higher than either the actual
realization of inflation or the forecast of inflation based on survey data.
This suggests that in the UK, the inflation risk premium on conven-
tional bonds dominates the liquidity premium on indexed bonds, and
that the liquidity difference between conventional and indexed govern-
ment bonds is much smaller there.
Data on trading volumes provide additional evidence that the liq-
uidity difference between indexed and conventional bonds is smaller in
the UK than the United States. In recent years, the ratio of the trading
volume of indexed Gilts to that of conventional Gilts has usually been
more than 10 percent. In contrast, the ratio of trading volumes for
indexed and conventional U.S. Treasuries has ranged from 1 to 2
1⁄2 per-
cent. One reason there is less disparity in trading volumes in the UK is
that the UK began issuing indexed debt earlier. As a result of this ear-
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lier start, indexed debt constitutes a much larger portion of government
debt in the UK—around 30 percent compared with less than 5 percent
for the United States. 
The fact that the yield spread in the UK appears to generally exceed
expected inflation due to the inflation risk premium might seem to
reduce the usefulness of the yield spread as indicator of market inflation
expectations. For monetary policymakers, however, the distinction
between an increase in market inflation expectations and an increase in
the inflation risk premium may not be that important, as they both
point to weakened public confidence in the central bank’s ability to con-
trol inflation.30 Therefore, for central banks, the variability of the infla-
tion risk premium is less problematic than the variability of the liquidity
premium because the knowledge of the change of the sum of inflation
expectation and the inflation risk premium is as useful as the knowledge
of the change in inflation expectation alone.
To  summarize, the experience of the UK suggests that if the U.S.
Treasury keeps issuing inflation indexed Treasuries and their liquidity

















THE UK EXPERIENCE WITH INDEX LINKED GILTS
Sources: Bank of England, Consensus Economics Inc., and National Statistics
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That should allow the yield spread to better approximate market
expected inflation, at least in noncrisis times.
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ENDNOTES
1 TIPS are officially called Treasury Inflation Indexed Securities (TIIS).
2 For example, the first 10-year TIPS was issued in January 1997, with a total
issuance of $7 billion. The issuance was “reopened” in April of the same year, at
which time an additional $8 billion was auctioned off. Shen (1995), and Dupont and
Sack provide detailed explanations of TIPS. Additional details can be found on the
Treasury Department website, http://www.treasurydirect.gov/bpd/bpdhome.htm.
3 On October 31, 2001, the Treasury suspended future auctions of both con-
ventional and indexed 30-year Treasury securities.
4 The numbers are based on the monthly statement of public debt at the end of
September 2001, which can be found at http://www.treasurydirect.gov/opd/
opdhisms.htm. Excluding debt instruments with maturities of less than one year
(Treasury bills), the share represented by TIPS rises to 7 percent. Note that the ratio of
the outstanding value of TIPS to the outstanding value of conventional Treasuries is
higher than the ratio of par values because the principal of TIPS grows with inflation.
5 In most of the article, we focus on the yield to maturity. If a debt instrument
is sold before its maturity, its return may differ from the yield to maturity. 
6 The effects of inflation are especially serious when the security has a long
maturity. For example, many investors bought 40-year Treasury bonds issued in
1955, which had a fixed nominal coupon rate of 3 percent. Because inflation aver-
aged 4.4 percent for the next 40 years, investors who bought this bond at full price
and held it to maturity lost, in terms of purchasing power, more than 43 percent in
real terms. In other words, for every dollar investors lent to the government in
1955, all the interest payments and principal redemption in the following 40 years
amounted to a total of less than 57 cents in terms of 1955 purchasing power.
7 Strictly speaking, it is the average inflation from November 2000 to Octo-
ber 2010 that should be used in the calculation as the Treasury uses the CPI with
a three-month lag when making the inflation adjustment. 
8 The discussion in the text ignores the effect of income tax. As income tax is
levied on nominal investment incomes, all non tax-exempt investors are exposed to
some inflation risk, including investors in TIPS. Nevertheless, the inflation risk is
still smaller to TIPS investors than to investors in conventional Treasuries. For a
detailed discussion of the tax effect, see Shen (1995).
9 Nominal (real) yield is calculated by using the nominal (real) coupon rate of
the Treasury and the market price for the par principal, assuming it is held to
maturity.
10 Another group of measures of market expected inflation use statistical
models and observations on the term structure of interest rates. These measures,
however, often provide a wide range of estimates and rely heavily on many explicit
and implicit assumptions, making the results difficult to interpret.
11 For example, the fee for selling both conventional and indexed Treasuries held
in Treasury Direct accounts through the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago is $34.
12 Yet another risk associated with selling a debt instrument before its matu-
rity is price risk. Theoretically, the price risk of an indexed Treasury can either be
higher or lower than that of a conventional Treasury. For an indexed Treasury, the
main price risk is due to changes in the market prevailing real interest rate. For a
conventional Treasury, price risk can be caused by either changes in the real inter-
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est rate or changes in market expected inflation. On one hand, conventional Trea-
suries may have higher price risk as their values are exposed to more kinds of risk.
On the other hand, a given change in the real interest rate tends to have a bigger
impact on the price of an indexed Treasury, because the cash payments of an
indexed Treasury are more back-loaded. The empirical evidence in the UK govern-
ment debt market suggests that the first effect outweighs the second, causing the
price risk of an inflation indexed security to be lower than that of a conventional
one (Shen 1998). 
13 The third section shows that the liquidity risks of different conventional
Treasuries differ enough so that it is sometimes useful to distinguish among them.
14 An additional complication is that the market for conventional Treasuries
and the market for TIPS may serve two very different investing clienteles, which
means that the yield difference may reflect differences in the expectations of the
two groups. This factor may have been particularly important when the TIPS mar-
ket was small and relatively new. As time goes by, presumably the clientele effect
should decline as more and more investors get familiar with the market.
15 As the spread is based on securities with different vintages, there may be a
slight maturity difference between the conventional and inflation-indexed Trea-
suries. For example, in December, the yield on the TIPS issued in January of the
same year is the yield on a security with nine years and one month to maturity. In
contrast, the yield on the conventional Treasury has been adjusted so that it has
exactly ten years to maturity. 
16 Although TIPS were first introduced in January 1997, the first few months
of data are likely of poor quality because TIPS were a new instrument to the mar-
ket. During this time, the market may have needed to adjust to and learn about
the new security. For example, TIPS yields were initially low because of both high
demand due to their novelty and small supply.
17 For reasons why the average of all forecasts may be better than most indi-
vidual forecasts, see Granger and Newbold (pp. 266-67).
18 Various measures of inflation are available. This article focuses on CPI infla-
tion is because TIPS are indexed to the CPI.
19 While it is still too early to compare the yield spread with realized inflation,
we can compute how low future inflation will have to be for the earlier forecast to
be accurate. For example, the average yield spread was 1.53 percent in 1998.
Actual inflation from 1998 to 2001 has averaged about 2.6 percent. Therefore,
inflation from 2002 to 2007 will have to average only 0.8 percent for the forecast
of yield spreads to hold.
20 An alternative way to evaluate the yield spread as a measure of expected
inflation is to compare the yield spread to recent inflation. Statistically, this
approach is equivalent to assuming that future average inflation will be the same
as the average of recent realized inflation. This approach also suggests that the
yield spread has been too low to be a reasonable forecast of inflation.
21 There are, however, still important differences in liquidity among conven-
tional Treasuries, in particular, between those that are newly issued and those that
are “aged.” Later in the section, these differences will be explored.
22 The ratio in Chart 4 uses the volume of conventional Treasuries with
coupons due in more than five years. This is the relevant measure because available
TIPS volume data include all maturities, most of which are greater than five years.
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23 These yields were kindly provided by Brian Sack at the Federal Reserve Board
of Governors, who used off-the-run notes and bonds to create an off-the-run yield.
24 The crisis started when Russia defaulted on its sovereign debt in late
August and was further intensified by the near default of a hedge fund, Long Term
Capital Management, in late September. The deterioration of financial market
functions continued until mid-October. Market conditions gradually improved in
November and December and the crisis was largely over by the spring of 1999.
25 The yield difference declined sharply in February 2000, when investors sud-
denly came to the realization that an ever expanding federal budget surplus would
render all Treasury securities scarce, including both on-the-run and off-the-run.
The announcement of a Treasury buy-back program may also have helped the liq-
uidity of some off-the-run securities.
26 See Sack for a useful discussion of liquidity conditions in Treasury markets. 
27 Another way to exploit information on the off-the-run liquidity premium is
to compute the yield spread using the yield on off-the-run Treasuries rather than
the yield on on-the-run Treasuries. This alternative approach was used by Sack,
who also adjusted in his study for the small difference in duration between 10-year
TIPS and conventional Treasuries. This article ignores the issue of duration because
first, as Sack showed in his study, it made little difference. Second, the concept of
duration is not particularly applicable to inflation indexed securities (Shen, 1995). 
28 The first TIPS to mature were issued in July 1997 as a 5-year security. The
next TIPS to mature were issued in January 1997 as a 10-year security. In addi-
tion, the Treasury could conceivably make a concerted effort to reduce the TIPS
liquidity premium still further by increasing the quantity and frequency of new
TIPS issues. Currently, new issues are heavily skewed toward conventional Trea-
suries. A slight shift toward increased TIPS issuance would be relatively easy to
implement and would help to reduce the liquidity disparity between the two.
29 Actually, the RPI figures used are from the month eight months prior to
the relevant date. This lag allows for the time lag in the release of the RPI data and
ensures that the nominal value of the next coupon payment is known before the
start of that period. This long lag weakens the inflation protection for Gilts that
are approaching their maturity. In contrast, the U.S. TIPS are indexed to CPI
lagged by only three months.
30 The Bank of England has regularly used the yield spread as one of the indi-
cators to its credibility of meeting the inflation target. Deacon and Derry provide
useful background information and many technical details. Barr and Campbell
provide empirical analysis of the yield spread.
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